USA: the economics of prison gangs

Why do prisoners join prison gangs? The answer lies in the fact that, like everyone else, prisoners respond to changes in costs and benefits. If a course of action becomes relatively more costly, people will do less of it — ceteris paribus — and vice versa. Subjective preferences help people decide how to weigh costs and benefits, and these cannot be ignored when looking at peoples’ decisions. It is not helpful to ignore inmates preferences just because we do not share them, and because we are not in a similar situation.

Prison gangs have not always been present in the American penal system so understanding the factors that have given rise to their growth is key to seeing prisoners as rational actors. One explanation for prison gangs is that they provide a service which many prisoners demand.

Prison gangs, for instance, can provide services similar to those offered by government institutions. But those in prison lack formal access to the governance mechanisms that are common on the outside. This absence of an ordinary-style government on the inside of a prison meant informal norm-based systems of behavior were necessary to regulate behavior.

Historically decentralized norms have been sufficient to self-govern prisoners prior to the rise of prison gangs. Norms help to identify what is socially permissible behavior, such as holding the door open for others. In a prison, there is no official law dictating these informal rules, but instead they develop over time, and they are an inexpensive way to govern. This style of governance works until populations get too large and it becomes too costly to remember all the information of what is and isn’t acceptable. Organizations can then arise to solve many of the problems norms address, but through centralized processes.

Prior to the 1970s the set of norms that existed in the US prison system is generally referred to as the “convict code,” based on the ideals of never helping officials while respecting other inmates. These norms arose as prisoners had to find ways to engage in mutually beneficial behaviors with strangers. Without this, for example, contraband markets would be nonexistent. Prior to the proliferation of prison populations in the 1960s, decentralized punishment mechanisms served as a powerful way to discourage dishonesty. But while populations got larger they also became younger and more violent, breaking down the effectiveness of the convict code.

These shifting prison cultures derailed the convict code and paved the way for the rise of prison gangs.

Gangs do not randomly form and instead fill power voids by creating mutually beneficial bonds between gang members. When normal governance does not work to protect private property rights, organizations can instead offer protection. This happens outside of prison as well: historically, the Italian Mafia is a good example.

David Skarbek in Social Order of the Underworld identifies the Mexican Mafia as the first prison gang, comprised of Hispanics largely from California street gangs. As they moved among prisons in California, their influence spread and other gangs formed for protection and competition in illicit prison markets.

Another factor leading to the formation of gangs is the increasing demand for contraband.

Read full article